He promised he would.
A few days later, Vivian asked Callan whether he would speak with the review team about the Greystone reports. He agreed, and they met in a neutral conference room with counsel present. Callan recognized portions of his original work in two documents bearing the consulting firm's name. One report included a chart he had designed to compare liquidity pressure across different settlement periods. The chart contained a small typo in the explanatory text, a misspelled heading he had corrected in a later version. The Greystone document reproduced the old mistake exactly.
"That proves this copy came from an earlier draft," Callan said. "It doesn't prove who supplied it or what the consultant knew."
Ivette looked at him with interest. "You're unusually cautious about making an accusation against someone who seems to have profited from your work."
"I know how it feels when people decide the answer before they examine the evidence. I'd prefer not to do it to somebody else."
The remark stayed with Vivian long after the interview ended.
They eventually traced the document history to a series of emails in which Blaine's office had sent internal analysis to Greystone and requested that it be reformatted as an external executive assessment. The consulting invoices did not reflect the amount of original work supplied, and the firm had described its contribution in terms suggesting it had created the analysis. The findings raised serious questions about misleading expense approvals and conflicts of interest. Dana referred the matter to outside specialists and the board audit committee, who would determine whether additional formal reporting was required.
One of Greystone's junior employees provided an interview through counsel. She remembered being asked to replace author names on internal reports with generic team labels before they were sent back to Ashford Meridian. She had questioned the instruction and been told that the company wanted uniform presentation. She showed investigators her notes from that period, including the project dates and the names of the people who requested the change. She was not offered immunity or praise in exchange for the account. She was asked to tell the truth, and she did.
The technical findings also revealed a more serious problem than the Eastbridge exception. Two other large clients had been offered commitments that depended on optimistic assumptions about incoming funds. The contracts were valuable; together with Eastbridge they represented hundreds of millions of dollars in potential business. But much of that value was projected over several years, and the commitments would be difficult to sustain if economic conditions changed. Blaine's reports had treated future revenues as nearly certain and had not accurately described the risks that could interrupt them.
Vivian called the clients before they learned the facts from a newspaper. One demanded an immediate independent review. Another paused new transactions while existing obligations were examined. The third asked for an outside assurance report before discussing renewal. The effect on projected revenue was painful, and the board reacted with predictable alarm. Some directors argued that Vivian should have waited until the company had a better solution before telling anyone.